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WHITHER REASONABLE SUSPICION: THE SUPREME COURT’S
FUNCTIONAL ABANDONMENT OF THE REASONABLENESS
REQUIREMENT FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURES
Steven Grossman*
INTRODUCTION
Although the United States Supreme Court’s approach to issues governing
application of the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment has
mutated over the years, at least one aspect of its approach has remained constant.
Before information leading to probable cause or its lesser iteration of reasonable
suspicion is found to exist, the government must demonstrate in some meaningful
way the reliability of the person providing the information or of the information
itself.1 Lacking such reliability, no search or seizure based on probable cause or
reasonable suspicion is permitted.
In its recent decision in Navarette v. California,2 the Court largely abandoned
the requirement that this reliability be meaningful. It did so by holding that an
anonymous 911 call without any impactful corroboration could supply the reason-
able suspicion necessary to effect a seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment.3
This abandonment significantly increases the ability of the government to deprive
a person of his or her freedom in conducting a seizure. Now, such a seizure can be
effected without the government demonstrating that the individual who provided
the information justifying the seizure is worthy of belief in any manner that has
traditionally been used by the Court to show reliability. In its effort to justify this
approach to reliability, the Court in Navarette misinterpreted rather egregiously its
previous holdings on reliability in similar cases, and then offered new arguments to
buttress its decision. These new arguments are unpersuasive in their application to
the facts of Navarette and, even more troubling, are at odds with the principles
embodied in the Fourth Amendment.
Section I of this Article will examine the Supreme Court’s foundational
decisions regarding the requirements for the government to show probable cause
and the lower standard of reasonable suspicion for less intrusive searches and
seizures. Section II will focus on the Court’s application of the reliability
requirement for determining reasonable suspicion in the two cases that are directly
* Dean Julius Isaacson Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author would like to thank
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1. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
2. 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
3. Id. at 1686.
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on point with the facts and legal issues raised in Navarette. Section III will explore
the Court’s holding in Navarette—examining the Court’s misapplication of the
principles of previous holdings and the flawed reasoning used to justify the
reliability of an anonymous, uncorroborated 911 call. One of the methods offered
by the Court to show reliability involved the application of arguably related
hearsay exceptions. Accordingly, Section IV will assess the propriety of using
evidentiary principles in reaching determinations of constitutional law. The Article
will conclude with a suggested approach for determining reliability in cases that
rely on the presence of reasonable suspicion to justify a seizure protected by the
Fourth Amendment.
I. THE MEANING OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND REASONABLE SUSPICION
A. Probable Cause
In describing the information necessary to constitute probable cause—allowing
the government to engage in searches or seizures consistent with the principles of
the Fourth Amendment—the Supreme Court has consistently required the pres-
ence of two elements. First, either the person who provides the information or the
information itself must be reliable.4 Second, the government must establish a basis
for the knowledge that the informant claims to possess.5 While the Court’s
approach to the relationship between reliability and basis of knowledge has
evolved, the Court has always required that some degree of both be present to
establish probable cause.
Beginning with the Court’s holdings in Aguilar v. Texas6 and Spinelli v. United
States,7 the Court has examined two aspects of the information police must have in
order to demonstrate the existence of probable cause to engage in a search or
seizure. First, either the person providing the information about criminal activity
or evidence of a crime (the informant) or the information itself must be shown to
be reliable.8 In other words, there must be some reason to trust that the information
is truthful.9 Second, the informant must have a basis for the knowledge he claims
to possess.10 Trustworthy though he may be, the government must establish how
the informant knew what he claimed to know for probable cause to exist.11
4. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
5. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
6. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
7. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
8. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415–16; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
9. See supra note 1; see also Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (“Probable cause exists where
‘the facts and circumstances within their [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an
offense has been or is being committed.” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).
10. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
11. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
350 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:349
Many courts have interpreted this two-prong approach, known as the Aguilar/
Spinelli test, to require that each prong separately reach the level of more probable
than not.12 In establishing this approach to probable cause, the Court appeared to
require that the aforementioned reliability and basis of knowledge prongs be
demonstrated independently of one another.13 A number of factors contribute to
reliability, some of which were deemed more probative than others. One who takes
an oath to the truth of what he is saying, such as the affiant in an application for a
search or arrest warrant, is deemed reliable because more probably than not he is
unlikely to subject himself to penalties for perjury by lying under oath.14 If no oath
is taken, such as in warrantless searches or seizures, or if the person with
information leading to a warrant is not an affiant, reliability must be established by
other means. For example, sufficient reliability can be established absent an oath
by the informant where the affiant is a police officer and the person with the
information providing the probable cause previously gave information to the
police that proved to be correct.15 If one who is deemed reliable through his or her
status (e.g., a police officer) corroborates in some way the information provided by
the informant, that too can show reliability.16 The basis of knowledge prong is
proven by either sensory perception,17 such as by a statement that the informant
saw the gun or smelled the marijuana, or by details showing that the informant has
intimate knowledge of the whereabouts of evidence of a crime.18
Nineteen years after its decision in Aguilar and fourteen years after deciding
Spinelli, the Court substantially refined its approach to the two-prong test in
Illinois v. Gates.19 In Gates, the Court made it easier for the police to satisfy the
probable cause test by holding that judges should now employ a totality of the
12. That was, in fact, the view of the Illinois Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887 (Ill. 1981),
whose decision was reversed by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See also Stanley v.
Maryland, 313 A.2d. 847, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974) (“[T]he dual requirements represented by the
‘two-pronged test’ are ‘analytically severable’ and an ‘overkill’ on one prong will not carry over to make up for a
deficit on the other prong.”).
13. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 228 (describing how some courts have interpreted Spinelli as requiring that the
source “satisfy each of the two independent requirements before it could be relied on”).
14. See United States v. Hadaway, 681 F.2d 214, 218 (4th Cir. 1982) (considering relevant to the reliability of
witness testimony the fact that “self-exposure to a perjury charge is unlikely”). In explaining this, one court wrote,
“[t]he reason for the rule requiring independent corroboration of the informant’s reliability disappears where the
informant comes forward to give an eyewitness account regarding the crime under oath, and subjects himself to
perjury if the information is false.” United States v. Hunley, 567 F.2d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 1977).
15. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303–04 (1967).
16. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–45.
17. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
18. See id. at 416 (explaining that the information received by an FBI source failed to meet the basis of
knowledge prong because the informant did not state that he had personally seen the activity or engaged in the
activity with the defendant).
19. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
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circumstances approach.20 Courts reviewing warrants for probable cause could
throw all the information into one analytical pot and decide if there was a
“substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed.21 A weakness in
either reliability or basis of knowledge could be compensated for by a strong
showing in the other.22 Among the advantages the Court asserted would result
from this new approach was that police and courts could avoid the “rigid” analysis
required by the Aguilar/Spinelli test.23 Still, the decision suggested there must be
some element of both reliability and basis of knowledge for probable cause to be
present.24
The task now is to see how the Court’s probable cause decisions concerning
search or seizure have been applied in cases where a Fourth Amendment intrusion
exists but is limited.
B. Reasonable Suspicion
Beginning with its landmark decision in Terry v. Ohio,25 the Court has permitted
law enforcement to engage in limited searches and seizures on a standard of proof
less than probable cause. Referred to by a variety of names, including “articulable
suspicion,” “reasonable suspicion,” and “individualized suspicion,” the Court has
been consistent in requiring some degree of both reliability and basis of knowl-
edge, albeit less than is required to show probable cause.26 This Section will
examine the Court’s holdings regarding the reliability that must be present to
demonstrate the existence of reasonable suspicion.
20. Id. at 230–32, 238 (“[W]e conclude that it is wiser to abandon the ‘two-pronged test’ established by our
decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that
traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.”).
21. See id. at 246.
22. Id. at 233.
23. See id. at 230–31, 236.
24. The Court in Gates did not explicitly require the presence of both reliability and basis of knowledge in
every case, but referred to the two factors as “highly relevant” in the probable cause determination. Gates, 462
U.S. at 230. The Court later referred to the approved totality of circumstances test as one “which permits a
balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an
informant’s tip.” Id. at 234. Cases decided by the Court after Gates that concerned whether the probable cause
mandate of the Fourth Amendment was satisfied have required the existence of some degree of reliability. It is
especially noteworthy that even when the Court has applied the lower probable cause standard of articulable
suspicion, such as in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), and Navarette
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014), the Court has required the presence of some reliability, regardless of the
Court’s ultimate determination as to the sufficiency of the reliability. Regarding the reliability and basis of
knowledge factors, it is therefore safe to conclude, as one treatise declared, that “courts continue to rely upon the
elaboration of these factors in earlier cases decided under the now-discarded Aguilar formula.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE
ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 147 (4th ed. 2004). What was abandoned in Gates was not the requirement of
showing reliability and basis of knowledge, but the need to show them independently of one another.
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270–73 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–31 (1990);
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22.
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In Terry, the Court created a new path to analyze government intrusions that
implicated the Fourth Amendment but that were less substantial than full-blown
searches and seizures. A Cleveland police officer observed John Terry walk back
and forth in front of a jewelry store, repeatedly looking inside the store window,
and then speaking quietly to another man standing nearby.27 The officer, Martin
McFadden, approached Terry and asked for his name.28 Based on his professional
experience, Officer McFadden suspected Terry was planning a robbery by “cas-
ing” the store.29 When Terry “mumbled something” in response to McFadden’s
request for his name, Officer McFadden’s suspicions were heightened. Fearing that
Terry might have a gun, McFadden felt the pocket of Terry’s overcoat, from which
he recovered a gun.30
The issues in Terry had previously been framed around whether a suspect was
“arrested” when stopped by the police; and, if the suspect was frisked for weapons,
whether he had been “searched.” Some had argued that such limited actions did not
require the protections of the Fourth Amendment.31 The Court in Terry explicitly
rejected this argument, asserting that forcible stops not rising to the level of an
“arrest” are still “seizures,” and limited pat-downs are still “searches.”32 Thus,
each action activated the protections of the Fourth Amendment.33 Probable cause
to arrest would have required that Terry more probably than not had committed a
crime. Probable cause to search would hold the police to the same standard
regarding the presence of contraband or evidence of a crime on Terry prior to the
search that revealed the gun.34
The Court took a different approach entirely in holding that Officer McFadden’s
conduct did not constitute a violation of Terry’s rights under the Fourth Amend-
ment. It held that although Terry had been seized and then searched, thus
implicating the Fourth Amendment, the seizure fell short of a traditional arrest and
the pat-down of the outer layer of Terry’s clothing fell short of a full-blown
search.35 By distinguishing between levels of intrusion, the Court permitted the
police conduct, requiring a quantum of proof less than probable cause, which came
27. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5–6.
28. Id. at 6–7.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id. at 5–7.
31. See id. at 16.
32. Id. at 16–17, 19.
33. Id.
34. Cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); see also 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arrest § 9 (2016) (“Under the Fourth
Amendment, the standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense; this standard, like
those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the individual’s right to liberty
and the state’s duty to control crime.”).
35. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24–27.
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to be known as reasonable suspicion.36
In the years since its decision in Terry, the Court has fleshed out the meaning of
reasonable suspicion both through defining the term and by applying it to specific
situations. The constant thread that runs through the Court’s definition of reason-
able suspicion is that it must be based on words or actions that lead a police officer
to suspect criminal conduct by the target of the search or seizure.37 This suspicion
must not merely be a hunch, but instead must be based on objective facts and
rational inferences that a police officer can articulate.38 In applying these prin-
ciples to factual situations since Terry, the Court has understandably borrowed
from what it had established in previous cases regarding probable cause to search
or seize. Thus, as it made clear with regards to probable cause, some degree of both
reliability and basis of knowledge, albeit less, must be present to permit police
officers to engage in the kind of limited searches and seizures identified in Terry.39
While there has been much controversy over the amount of suspicious conduct
required to establish an adequate basis of knowledge that criminal activity is
afoot,40 this Article will focus on the reliability prong of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and the damage done to it by the Navarette decision.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF ANONYMOUS
INFORMANTS IN CASES OF LIMITED SEIZURES BEFORE NAVARETTE
In its decisions involving government intrusions that implicate the Fourth
Amendment, the Court has always required that the information used to establish
probable cause or reasonable suspicion contain elements of reliability.41 That is, no
matter how compelling or detailed the information is, it is insufficient to justify
such an intrusion unless the information or the supplier of the information is
36. The Court reasoned that because of the necessity for quick police action in these types of street encounters,
the normal requirement of probable cause that attended the issuance of a warrant would not be reasonable here. Id.
at 20–24.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981). In Cortez, the Court referred to the two requisite
elements of reasonable suspicion: (1) the assessment must be based on objective facts taking into consideration all
of the evidence an officer has prior to acting, including reasonable inferences he may draw; and (2) that this
information leads to a “particularized suspicion” that the suspect is “engaged in wrongdoing.” Id. at 418.
38. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.
39. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
40. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Inverse Relationship Between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New
York City “Stop and Frisk,” 94 B.U. L. REV. 1495, 1535–50 (2014); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien
Bernache, The “High Crime Area” Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth
Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587 (2008) (discussing the amorphous concept
of “high-crime areas” and their basis for establishing per se suspicious conduct therein). An example of a Supreme
Court case demonstrating the uncertainty about how much of a basis of knowledge is sufficient to justify a limited
seizure is Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). In Wardlow, four justices dissented from the majority
opinion’s assertion that unprovoked flight in a high crime area was sufficient to demonstrate the presence of
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a seizure. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1969);
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964).
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trustworthy. Over the years, the Court has enumerated various methods through
which the government can demonstrate that the information or the person supply-
ing evidence of a crime or criminal activity is sufficiently reliable to permit the
government to search or seize.42
Any assessment of the reliability factors enumerated by the Supreme Court must
begin with the understanding that these factors do not have to demonstrate the
reliability of the informant or his or her information beyond any doubt. Reliability
is one of two factors that contribute to showing more probably than not that
evidence will be found at a certain location for a search, and that the item seized in
fact constitutes evidence of a crime.43 To effect a full-blown seizure of an
individual (that is, an arrest or an arrest equivalent), the required showing for the
same degree of more probable than not is that a suspect has committed or is
committing a crime. In order to engage in the limited search and seizure first
enunciated by the Court in Terry, as discussed above, the police need to satisfy the
lower standard of reasonable suspicion.44 Accordingly, in assessing the seizure of
the defendant in Navarette, we must analyze whether and to what extent reliability
must be present in instances of limited seizures, and whether such reliability was
present when Navarette and his car were seized.
Two cases decided by the Supreme Court stand as signposts of what constitutes
sufficient reliability and, significantly, what does not, when it comes to determin-
ing the legality of a limited seizure of a person. The Court found the limited seizure
in Alabama v. White45 was justified by reasonable suspicion but referred to it as “a
close case.”46 Until the decision in Navarette, White represented the minimum
amount of information regarding the reliability of an informant that was necessary
to provide reasonable suspicion. The later case of Florida v. J.L.47 represents the
type of fact pattern in which the Court found the level of reliability to be
insufficient. Both cases dealt with anonymous informants providing tips through
the telephone—the same type of informant at issue in Navarette. In assessing
whether sufficient reliability is present to justify a limited seizure in Navarette, it is
incumbent to determine whether the factors historically used by the Court to
demonstrate reliability—the very factors used in White and J.L.—are present, or
whether other factors in Navarette offer new ways of showing reliability.
42. See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
43. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230; Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 413; Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114; see also Erica Goldberg,
Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 800 (2013) (explaining
that reliability is a factor in a totality assessment for determining probable cause).
44. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
45. 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
46. Id. at 332.
47. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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A. Alabama v. White
In Alabama v. White, an anonymous call detailed how a named woman would
leave a particular building at a specified time, drive a brown car of a specified
make and model that had a broken taillight, and head for a particular motel with an
ounce of cocaine in a brown attache´ case.48 Officers responding to the call saw a
woman leave the designated building and enter a car fitting the precise description
from the call.49 They followed her as she “drove the most direct route” to the motel
and stopped her as she entered the road on which the motel was located.50 In the
car, they found a brown attache´ case. After obtaining White’s consent, they found
marijuana in the attache´ case and cocaine in her purse.51
In its analysis of the seizure of White in her car, the Court made clear that the
factors used to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion for the limited
seizure in that case were the same as those used to assess the requirement of
probable cause for a full-blown seizure. Although these factors—reliability and
basis of knowledge—need not be present to the same extent to justify limited
seizures as full-blown ones, their presence is still required to demonstrate reason-
able suspicion.52 After observing that anonymous tips rarely establish the reliabil-
ity of the information provided by the tipster,53 the Court noted that the anonymous
tip here was comparable to the one in Illinois v. Gates in that each “‘provides
virtually nothing from which one might conclude that [the caller] is either honest
or his information reliable.’”54 The Court compared the information that corrobo-
rated the tip in Gates to the information found in White and concluded that
although the corroborating information in Gates was more detailed and complete,
the corroboration in the instant case was still significant in what was predicted and
verified by the police.55 The police “significantly” corroborated that a woman
would be leaving a specific building, getting into a specific car, and heading to a
specific destination.56 While some details of the informant’s tip, such as the name
of the woman, were not corroborated before the limited seizure—as was the case in
Gates—the key factor was that the police could verify the accuracy of the
informant’s predictions about White’s behavior.57
As in Gates, the White Court noted two factors related to the predictive character
of the informant’s call, which contributed to the informant’s reliability. First,
48. 496 U.S. at 327.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 328–29.
53. Id. at 329.
54. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983)).
55. See id. at 331–32.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 332.
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“because an informant is shown to be right about some things, he is probably right
about other facts that he has alleged, including the claim that the object of the tip is
engaged in criminal activity.”58 In referring to the other important factor relevant
to the reliability of the tip, the White Court quoted Gates in noting that the tips in
both cases “contained a range of details relating not just to easily obtained facts
and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties
not easily predicted.”59
Therefore, it is the fact that the anonymous informant in White was able to
predict the future movements of the suspect that the informant’s tip was reliable—
the informant did not merely provide information that any casual observer could
have come by.60 The Court emphasized the importance of this point by contrasting
it with an informant’s accurate description of a car parked outside a certain
building: “[a]nyone” in the viewing area could have provided the information
about the car and, therefore, such a statement adds little, if any, weight to whether
the informer is believable or whether he or she is lying.61
B. Florida v. J.L.
It was precisely the fact that anyone in the viewing area could have observed a
young black man wearing a plaid shirt at a particular bus stop—as described by an
anonymous caller—that failed to establish the reliability of the phone tip in
Florida v. J.L. In J.L., the anonymous tipper claimed the young man was carrying a
gun.62 The fact that police officers corroborated the presence of a man matching
the description and location of a man referred to by the tip did little to show that the
58. Id. at 331.
59. Id. at 332.
60. The Court in Spinelli contrasted corroboration of the information provided to police in that case with that
provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). While in Spinelli the police
corroborated information that the Court characterized as “a meager report” that could have been merely “an
offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar,” in Draper the informant was shown to be reliable because specific
information he provided and activity he predicted turned out to be accurate. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410, 416–19 (1969).
61. White, 496 U.S. at 332. As the Court said in comparing the quality of the information regarding the mere
sighting of the car with the predictive information about the suspect and her activities:
Anyone could have ‘predicted’ that fact because it was a condition presumably existing at the time
of the call. What was important was the caller’s ability to predict respondent’s future behavior,
because it demonstrated inside information—a special familiarity with respondent’s affairs. The
general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the
building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel. Because only a
small number of people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to
believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable
information about that individual’s illegal activities . . . . When significant aspects of the caller’s
predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also
that he was well informed, at least well enough to justify the stop.
Id.
62. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
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caller was reliable or had any real knowledge about the suspect or whether he was
carrying a gun.63 The Court also noted that the officers saw no firearm before
seizing the suspect, nor did they observe any “threatening or otherwise unusual
movements” that might have suggested the presence of a weapon.64
The Court in J.L. contrasted the case with White because the tip in J.L., unlike
the tip in White, “provided no predictive information and therefore left the police
without means to test the informer’s knowledge or credibility.”65 Accurately
predicting the behavior or actions of another individual shows the informer has
some intimate knowledge of that person, and the fact that the informer was
credible about his predictions shows that he is more likely to be credible about
other claims he makes about the person. In White, such a prediction was just
enough to barely establish sufficient reliability to allow the police to engage in a
limited seizure. The Court in J.L. reaffirmed that its determination of the inform-
er’s reliability in White was close, and referred to the White holding as “border-
line.”66 Thus, it is clear that facts such as those in White constitute the bare
minimum the government must show in order to establish the reasonable suspicion
necessary to effect a limited seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
Given the Court’s decision in Navarette regarding a driver claimed to be
dangerous,67 the Court’s approach to another argument posed by the government
in J.L. is worth noting. The government argued that—because of the dangerous
situation created by a person carrying a firearm while standing with a group of
people—the Court should relax its requirement of reasonable suspicion in danger-
ous situations.68 The Court rejected this argument, noting that it would create a
slippery slope that could negate the reasonable suspicion requirement in other
potentially dangerous scenarios, such as where a tip alleges that a person is holding
a large amount of illegal drugs.69 However, the Court did not foreclose the
possibility that it might relax the reasonable suspicion standard in a case of
extreme danger, such as an allegation of a person carrying a bomb.70 Although the
Court noted the danger posed by armed criminals, it held that this was not the type
of extreme danger that might reduce the need for reasonable suspicion.71
In White and J.L., the Court established relatively clear and consistent guide-
lines for the reliability of the information that must be present for police to engage
63. See id. at 272 (“The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.”).
64. Id. at 268.
65. Id. at 271.
66. Id. at 270–71.
67. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014); see infra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
68. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
69. See id. at 272–73. The Court expressed a concern that police would have discretion to “frisk based on
bare-boned tips about narcotics,” based on the fact that “[s]everal Courts of Appeals have held it per se
foreseeable for people carrying significant amounts of illegal drugs to be carrying guns as well.” Id.
70. See id. at 273–74.
71. See id. at 272.
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in a limited seizure. Adding to this clarity, the Court used the two cases to create
borders for the amount of reliability necessary to show reasonable suspicion. It did
so by asserting that the anonymous tip in White was just barely enough to meet this
test for reliability, and that the tip in J.L. was not enough because it lacked the
accurate predictive nature necessary to show that the informant was believable and
knowledgeable. With these boundaries in mind, the task, then, is to see if the
Court’s holding in Navarette stayed true to its previous holdings, or whether it
enumerated new factors regarding reliability necessary for a seizure that are
consistent with the principles embodied in the Fourth Amendment. In fact, the
Navarette Court did neither.
III. NAVARETTE V. CALIFORNIA
In analyzing the decision in Navarette, this Section will begin with a discussion
of the Court’s misapplication of the reliability factors upon which it based its
decisions in both White and J.L. Next, the Section will assess the Court’s use of
reliability factors beyond those discussed in White and J.L.—factors that had been
used by the Court in other contexts, and still others never before used to
demonstrate reliability. None of these factors, when applied to the facts of
Navarette, make out a convincing case for the presence of the type of reliability
required to constitute reasonable suspicion for Fourth Amendment purposes.
A. The Court’s Misuse of the Reliability Factors from White and J.L.
Responding to an anonymous 911 call that the driver of a specified truck had run
the caller’s car off the road, an officer of the California Highway Patrol located the
truck and apparently followed it for five minutes.72 He then stopped the truck and
was joined by a second officer.73 Both officers smelled marijuana, which led them
to search the vehicle.74 The officers recovered thirty pounds of marijuana.75 When
the case arrived to the Supreme Court, the issue was whether the limited seizure of
Navarette and his truck was predicated on the presence of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, as required by the Fourth Amendment and the Court’s decisions
since Terry v. Ohio.76 Critical to this determination was whether the information
possessed by police prior to the stop was reliable—the same question that was
before the Court in both White and J.L.
As in those two previous cases, the information came to the police via an
anonymous telephone call. It is undisputed that where informants do not identify
themselves, the information they provide bears a lower level of reliability.77 Such
72. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686–87 (2014).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1687.
76. Id.
77. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1990); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983).
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informants assume no risk if they are lying, and there is nothing about them or their
status in the community that lends support to their credibility. In order for an
anonymous call to lead to reasonable suspicion, the government must provide
additional means by which the information in the call can be determined to be
reliable. For informants whose identity is entirely unknown, this can take the form
of observations by the police or others of details provided by the informant that
prove the accuracy of at least some of the informant’s claims.78 It was the police
corroboration of such details, or the lack thereof, that led to the respective
decisions in White and J.L.
In analyzing whether the anonymous tip in Navarette is sufficiently reliable to
meet the test for establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, we must
consider first whether the relevant factors enumerated by the Court in White and
J.L. are present. The White Court found reliability because the anonymous tip was
corroborated by police observations. Specifically, the Court noted that since these
observations had proven the informant to be reliable on certain details, he was
likely reliable on his central statement that White was transporting drugs.79 In so
noting, the Court observed that the details about which the informant was correct
were the kinds of things likely to be known only by those with intimate knowledge
of the suspect’s activities, and not merely what could be seen by a casual
observer.80 In Navarette, the only information in the anonymous tip corroborated
by police observations was the presence of the car described by the informant
along the road traveled by both. Of course anyone on that road, including those
with no knowledge of any suspicious activity by Navarette, could have described
the same car while looking at it.81 In fact, the suspicious activity described by the
anonymous tip—the dangerous driving—was not observed by the patrol car
officers as they watched Navarette drive for five minutes before pulling his truck
over.82 While the police’s failure to observe dangerous driving does not absolutely
negate the informant’s claim, it certainly does nothing to strengthen its reliabil-
78. See White, 496 U.S. at 330–32; Gates, 462 U.S. at 241–45.
79. See White, 496 U.S. at 331.
80. Id. at 332.
81. As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent in Navarette:
Here the Court makes a big deal of the fact that the tipster was dead right about the fact that a silver
Ford F-150 truck (license plate 8D94925) was traveling south on Highway 1 somewhere near mile
marker 88. But everyone in the world who saw the car would have that knowledge, and anyone
who wanted the car stopped would have to provide that information. Unlike the situation
in White, that generally available knowledge in no way makes it plausible that the tipster saw the
car run someone off the road.
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1693 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In referring to such easily obtained
facts, the Court in White wrote that “[t]he fact that the officers found a car precisely matching the caller’s
description in front of the 235 building is an example of the former. Anyone could have ‘predicted’ that fact
because it was a condition presumably existing at the time of the call.” White, 496 U.S. at 332.
82. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691.
360 AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:349
ity.83 The tip in Navarette is far more similar to that in J.L., which the Court
deemed lacking in the reliability needed to justify a limited seizure. As in
Navarette, the corroborated tip in J.L. described what anyone standing on the street
could have seen—a black man in a plaid shirt standing on the corner.84
The second aspect of reliability with respect to the tip in White, somewhat
related to the first, was the ability of the informant to correctly predict specific
details of White’s future activities.85 The police verified the informant’s claims that
a woman matching White’s description would leave a specific building, get into a
specific car, and travel to a specific location.86 These predictions, when shown to
be correct, added a significant element to the credibility of the informant. The
presence and absence of this predictive element was a key factor in both White and
J.L., respectively. In Navarette, the anonymous tip did not include a prediction of
the suspect’s future activity—unless inferentially one considers a claim of danger-
ous driving to be predictive of future bad driving. Even so, however, such a
“prediction” was not verified by the police, whose observations of Navarette’s
driving contained no allegation of recklessness or carelessness.87
83. In Terry v. Ohio, the Court made clear that had Terry done something to dispel the original suspicions
created by his apparently “casing” the store for a planned robbery, the justification for seizing him or, in that case,
for the continuation of the seizure would disappear. See 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). In his Navarette dissent, Justice
Scalia argued that not only was reasonable suspicion not present from the anonymous tip, but also that the
allegations in the tip were largely dispelled by the lack of any suspicious driving or other behavior by Navarette.
134 S. Ct. at 1696 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority opinion responded to this point by arguing that drunk
drivers have the ability and inclination to drive safely once they observe a police car following them. See id. at
1691. To this point, Justice Scalia responded:
Whether a drunk driver drives drunkenly, the Court seems to think, is up to him. That is not how I
understand the influence of alcohol. I subscribe to the more traditional view that the dangers of
intoxicated driving are the intoxicant’s impairing effects on the body—effects that no mere act of
the will can resist . . . . Consistent with this view, I take it as a fundamental premise of our
intoxicated-driving laws that a driver soused enough to swerve once can be expected to swerve
again—and soon. If he does not, and if the only evidence of his first episode of irregular driving is a
mere inference from an uncorroborated, vague, and nameless tip, then the Fourth Amendment
requires that he be left alone.
Id. at 1697 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Accepting the Court’s view on this point requires a belief that Navarette was
driving intoxicated and apparently was so intoxicated that he “ran the reporting party off the roadway” as the
police report stated. Id. at 1687. If “ran off” can be interpreted to mean Navarette deliberately forced the
informant’s car off the road, he must have been infuriated to an extreme level, no doubt fueled by his alcohol
intake. If it was not intentional, he must have been driving beyond recklessly. Either way, it seems unlikely that he
could drive for five minutes—what Justice Scalia referred to as a “long time,” id. at 1696 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)—without displaying any of the obvious signs given off by intoxicated drivers or the less overt ones
recognized by trained police officers.
84. See supra notes 62–71 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
87. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1691 (indicating “the absence of additional suspicious conduct” after
Navarette’s vehicle was first spotted by a police officer).
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B. The Presence or Absence of Other Reliability Factors
The final tasks in determining whether the anonymous tip in Navarette was
sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion are to consider: (1) the existence
of reliability factors not present in White or J.L. but that played a role in previous
cases; or (2) other factors never previously identified by the Court that could make
the tip reliable. This analysis must begin with the Navarette decision itself. The
majority opinion enumerated several such ways in which it claimed the reliability
of the anonymous tip was established.
1. The Claim by the Anonymous Informant That She Saw the Suspect Engage
in Criminal Activity
First, the Court referred to the fact that, unlike in White and J.L., the Navarette
informant claimed to have directly seen the suspect engage in suspicious activity
(that is, running her off the road, an apparent sign of his intoxicated driving),
which contributed to the reliability of the tip.88 This claim relates more to the
second prong for showing the existence of a basis of knowledge. There is some
support for the notion that a greater basis of knowledge on the part of an informant,
as indicated by a sensory observation, also contributes to the reliability of the tip.
In Illinois v. Gates, the Court spoke specifically to this point in determining that a
greater basis of knowledge can compensate for a lesser amount of reliability.89 But
as Gates implied, and decisions of the Court since Gates have demonstrated, there
still must be at least some aspects of reliability notwithstanding the strength of the
basis of knowledge.90
Would the anonymous informant in J.L., for example, have been any more
trustworthy had he said he saw the gun in the waist of the black man with the plaid
shirt on the corner than he was by just having reported the facts without stating that
he observed them? How about if the informant added that he saw the suspect take a
clear bag of cocaine and put it in his right front pocket and heard the suspect offer
some to the person standing next to him? Probable cause and reasonable suspicion
require a basis for concluding that the person providing the information leading to
a search or seizure protected by the Fourth Amendment is credible. It is no more
difficult for a person to make up three details than it is to make up one. Unless there
is corroboration of claims made by an anonymous informant, or some other means
of demonstrating the informant’s reliability, an informant who merely adds
additional details does not become more believable. If there are other means to
prove an informant’s reliability, then additional details could show that the
88. See id. at 1689.
89. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–34 (1983) (“[A] deficiency in one may be compensated for, in
determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of
reliability.”).
90. See supra note 24.
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informant had a solid basis of knowledge. Uncorroborated details alone, however,
cannot show that she was sufficiently reliable to deprive a suspect of his freedom
through a seizure.
Next, the Court in Navarette suggested that the tipster was reliable because the
police confirmed the existence of the specific truck described on the same road it
was originally observed on.91 As indicated above, however, this corroboration was
of a fact that any driver on the road could have seen and thus, as in J.L., should be
no indicator of reliability.92
2. The “Contemporaneousness” of the Call to the Incident
The Court asserted that the contemporaneousness of the call to the observation
of the criminal event was significant to the caller’s reliability.93 The Court
compared this form of reliability with two exceptions to the rule barring hearsay
testimony in trials.94 Those exceptions, known generally as the “excited utter-
ance”95 and “present sense impression” exceptions to the rule against hearsay,96
are premised on similar but somewhat analytically different premises. In analyzing
the requirements for application of those hearsay exceptions and the purposes
behind them, it is doubtful that either of those exceptions should be applied to the
anonymous call in Navarette.
In evidence law, statements about an event made soon after perceiving that
event are considered especially trustworthy because the “substantial contempora-
neity of event and statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious
misinterpretation.”97 This is the rationale for the “present sense impression”
exception to the hearsay rule. An “excited utterance” is a “statement relating to a
startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of the
excitement that it caused.”98 It is the relative immediacy of the statement to the
event and the event’s startling nature that support the reliability of an excited
utterance and allow hearsay statements into evidence.99
The Court’s conclusion in Navarette that the anonymous call would fall within
the present sense impression or excited utterance hearsay exceptions is debatable.
A lapse of time defeats the use of the present sense impression exception because it
is the contemporaneity of the statement to the event that establishes the statement’s
91. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
92. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
93. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
94. Id.
95. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
96. FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
97. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note).
98. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
99. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) (citing People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 407 (Colo.
2001)).
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trustworthiness.100 If time allows for reflective thought, intrinsic trustworthiness is
lost and the basis for the present sense impression exception vanishes.101 In the
words of one treatise on the Federal Rules of Evidence, the present sense
impression has a strict time requirement and should be “employed to admit
statements uttered during the course of the event or transaction or seconds after the
event or transaction.”102 Regarding the application of the present sense impression
and excited utterance exceptions to the time lapse between when the informant in
Navarette claimed her car was forced off the road and her 911 call, Justice Scalia
correctly observed:
It is the immediacy that gives to the statement some credibility . . . There is no
such immediacy here. The declarant had time to observe the license number of
the offending vehicle, 8D94925 (a difficult task if she was forced off the road
and the vehicle was speeding away), to bring her car to a halt, to copy down the
observed license number (presumably), and (if she was using her own cell
phone) to dial a call to the police from the stopped car. Plenty of time to
dissemble or embellish.103
While a lapse of time can defeat the application of the excited utterance exception,
courts have generally admitted hearsay statements uttered with more time between
the event and the statement than when applying the present sense impression
exception.104 That is because the stress of excitement caused by the event, which
forms the basis for the trustworthiness of the statement, can continue for a period
of time beyond the strict contemporaneity limit of a present sense impression. Still
though, the declarant has to be shown to be under “the stress of the excitement”
when she utters the hearsay statement.105 This stress can be shown by the “nature
of the event . . . the appearance, behavior, or condition of the speaker . . . [or] the
nature or contents of the statement.”106
100. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee’s note; see also GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, COMMENTARY, AND AUTHORITY 474 (2007) (“The
principle underlying the hearsay exception contained in Rule 803(1) is the assumption that statements of
perception, describing the event and uttered in close temporal proximity to the event, bear a high degree of
trustworthiness.”).
101. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 915 (1995); United States v.
Poliodore, 690 F.3d 705, 720 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d. 399, 413 (E.D. Va. 2002).
102. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 100, at 474; see also id. at 474 n.14 (citing Quick, Hearsay,
Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 210 (1960), for
the statement that, “[e]ven the argument that . . . spontaneity . . . is a reasonable guaranty of sincerity has been
questioned because psychological studies indicate that the time interval required to assure lack of conscious or
unconscious fabrication is measured in stopwatch time intervals rather than in minutes”).
103. Navarette v. California 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1694 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 1998) (indicating that strict contemporaneity
is not required for application of the excited utterance exception).
105. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 101, at 916.
106. Id. at 918–19.
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In Navarette, we know nothing of the speaker’s appearance or condition. There
is no mention of her voice indicating stress or excitement when she made the 911
call. The statement itself, given the precise nature of some of it, does little to show
this stress. What remains, then, is the nature of the event itself. Admittedly, being
forced off the road can create this kind of stress. In determining whether the stress
caused by the excitement of the event should give rise to the excited utterance
exception, one evidence treatise describes a key issue to be whether “[t]he stimulus
leaves the speaker momentarily incapable of fabrication.”107 It is fair to ask how
likely it is that the caller in Navarette was incapable of fabricating aspects of an
event that she observed approximately five minutes before making the 911 call.108
Two other factors have traditionally played a role in the decision of whether to
admit a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception. First, while not a
requirement for use of the exception, “[i]n the majority of cases, the occurrence of
the startling event is established by evidence independent of the declarant’s
statement, such as the testimony of other witnesses or circumstantial evidence
showing an unusual event occurred.”109 In Navarette, there is no evidence, other
than the call itself, of the caller’s car being driven off the road by the defendant.
Second, there is a difference in the nature and quality of hearsay statements when
the declarant is not only unavailable, but also unidentified. While also not an
absolute bar to admission of the statement, as one court has written, “unlike
unavailability which is immaterial to admission under [Federal] Rule [of Evi-
dence] 803, the unidentifiability of the declarant is germane to the admissibility
determination. A party seeking to introduce such a statement carries a burden
heavier than where the declarant is identified to demonstrate the statement’s
circumstantial trustworthiness.”110 Among other issues, where the declarant is not
unidentified, it becomes more difficult to show that the declarant has not had the
time or inclination to fabricate a statement.111 The identity of the caller in
Navarette was at no time known by another party involved in the case.
Whatever decision is made regarding the application of hearsay exceptions to
the statement of an anonymous informant, such a decision should merely be the
beginning of a discussion about whether the statements permit a seizure otherwise
107. Id. at 916. This determination is crucial because, as the Supreme Court held in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.
805, 820 (1990), “[t]he basis for ‘excited utterance’ exception, for example, is that such statements are given
under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is
trustworthy.”
108. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
109. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 100, at 479. The reason for that is because otherwise, “[t]he judge
would reason in a circle if, being bound by the hearsay rule, he nevertheless considered the statement for the
purpose of establishing the very fact which is the condition precedent to his original consideration of that
statement.” CAL. LAW REVISION COMM’N, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM
RULES OF EVIDENCE: ARTICLE VIII: HEARSAY EVIDENCE 468 (1962).
110. Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 510 (3d Cir. 1985).
111. See id.
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protected by the Fourth Amendment. Courts should also consider the core question
of whether the use of evidence principles makes sense when applied to constitu-
tional protections.112
3. 911 Reporting
The Navarette majority found additional support for the veracity of the anony-
mous call in the 911 emergency system itself.113 The Court told us that: (1) these
calls are recorded and can be used to identify, through voice recognition and later
verification, the identity of the caller; (2) cellular carriers must relay the caller’s
number to 911 dispatchers; and (3) callers cannot block their caller ID informa-
tion.114 The Court concluded, “a false tipster would think twice before using such a
system.”115 These claims, while meritorious to a degree, fall flat when considering
the majority’s other claim regarding the tip itself—that it was either a present sense
impression or an excited utterance, both of which require spontaneity and the
absence of opportunity to reflect upon the event.116
The majority attempted to have its proverbial cake and eat it too. On one hand,
and in support of the anonymous tip’s veracity, the Court cited the fact that the
caller reported the incident “soon after” it occurred, and that the caller was still
excited by the events.117 On the other hand, the Court claimed a 911 caller “would
think twice before using such a system.”118 These conclusions cannot coexist: the
caller either reported the event as it was happening (or with substantial contempo-
raneity) as to satisfy the hearsay exception requirements, or the caller had
sufficient time to consider the implications of making a 911 call. Finding one of
these rationales to be true removes the possibility of the other.
Furthermore, the Court assumed that the general public knows the various
technological features of the 911 emergency system. The Court pointed to various
FCC regulations regarding recording requirements imposed on 911 operators, but
failed to identify how these requirements are made known to the general public.119
Presumably, the caller who had insufficient time to fabricate a story had sufficient
time to contemplate the aforementioned FCC regulations.
a. How Reliable is the 911 System at Determining the Identity of an
Anonymous Caller?
The majority first asserted that since a 911 call “can be recorded,” a victim can
later attempt to “identify the false tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecu-
112. See infra Section IV.
113. Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
114. Id. at 1689–90.
115. Id. at 1690.
116. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
117. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
118. Id. at 1690.
119. See id.
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tion.”120 This assertion makes the following three assumptions. First, that the call
is indeed recorded.121 Second, assuming the call was recorded, that the recording is
preserved for later review. Third, assuming the call was recorded and preserved,
the victim or suspect who is the subject of the call is given an opportunity to listen
to the recording and challenge its veracity. In Navarette, we are not told whether
the call itself was recorded or simply transcribed, whether the recording—if it
existed—was preserved, or whether the suspect was permitted to listen to the
recording and attack its veracity.122
Even assuming, arguendo, that all 911 calls are recorded, there is no universal
guarantee that these recordings will be preserved for later follow-up and analysis.
It thus follows that simply because a 911 call is recorded does not mean that—as
the majority argues—a victim will have the opportunity to later challenge the tip.
Further, the damage is already done as far as eroding any Fourth Amendment
protection. Even if the subject of an anonymous tip can later attack the tip’s
veracity, the subject’s liberty has already been infringed upon at the moment she
was seized by the police. The Court’s rationale here, as with its use of evidentiary
rules to justify a seizure,123 appears to describe an admissibility issue rather than a
predicate to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure. In other words, holding that a
recorded 911 call could later be challenged in court is irrelevant for the purposes of
preventing the initial Fourth Amendment intrusion. Once the Fourth Amendment
is implicated by the seizure resulting from the anonymous 911 call, a determina-
tion that the seizure was improper does not undo the restriction on liberty created
by that seizure.
The Court asserts as additional indicia of the veracity of a 911 caller factors such
as cell phone number reporting, cell tower data, and the inability of callers to block
caller ID information.124 Research shows, however, that the vast majority of 911
calls made from wireless phones are delivered without adequate information to
locate the caller.125 Regarding cellular tower data, extensive research exists calling
into serious question the reliability of such data for the purposes of actually
determining the location of the caller.126 Unlike calls made from a landline,
120. Id.
121. See id. (noting that these calls “can” be recorded, not that they are or must be).
122. See id. at 1686–87, 1688–90 (describing the facts of the case, but without providing any information as to
the caller’s knowledge of the call being recorded).
123. See supra notes 97–106 and accompanying text.
124. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690.
125. See, e.g., Jon Brodkin, 9 Out of 10 Wireless 911 Calls in DC Don’t Provide Accurate Location Info, ARS
TECHNICA (July 10, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2014/07/9-out-of-10-wireless-911-calls-in-
dc-dont-provide-accurate-location-info.
126. See Leonard Deutchman, The Case For Making Cell Phone Tracking Data Available At Trial, 29 CRIM.
JUST. 22, 26 (2015) (noting that location tracking via cell tower data “is not the most reliable method”); Brodkin,
supra note 125; Tom Farley & Mark van der Hoek, Cellular Telephone Basics, PRIVATE LINE (Jan. 1, 2006, 8:55
PM), http://www.privateline.com/mt_cellbasics/ (explaining that cell tower data can be especially misleading
when attempting to pinpoint the location of a caller).
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wireless calls are routed and rerouted through numerous switches and towers,
based on cellular traffic and availability, and cannot provide enough information to
locate—even in an approximate sense—the location of the call.127
b. Assuming Identity Can be Determined, the Government Must Still
Demonstrate that the Caller Was Aware, or Should Have Been Aware, of the
Recording and Its Consequences in Determining Identity
Most importantly, for the majority’s assertions about 911 calls to be valid, the
caller must know or have constructive knowledge that all of these factors
(recording, number data, and ability to later listen and challenge) exist. If the
informant is unaware of these factors, motivation not to fabricate due to any
potential consequences vanishes.
In his dissent in Navarette, Justice Scalia directly applied the factors above to
the significance of the informant’s anonymity. Regarding the advancements in 911
technology and regulations, Justice Scalia asserted that it is not the reality or mere
existence of these facts, but the “‘tipster’s belief in anonymity’” that controls her
behavior.128 The facts in Navarette lend support to the conclusion that the caller
wished to remain anonymous. The caller did not provide her name to the
dispatcher, nor did she volunteer to be interviewed, make a statement to police, or
later identify the truck as the one that allegedly ran her off the road.129 This all
speaks to her belief that her 911 call was indeed anonymous. In sum, with respect
to reliability, there is no functional difference between an anonymous and
uncorroborated 911 call and an ordinary anonymous tip or accusation. Thus, such a
911 call cannot by itself provide the reliability necessary to establish reasonable
suspicion as required to justify a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
IV. THE ROLE OF EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES IN THE DETERMINATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
In determining the reliability of an anonymous tip for the purposes of satisfying
the Fourth Amendment, using language and standards that encompass hearsay
exceptions has an understandable appeal. Notwithstanding the general rule disal-
lowing out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of an asserted matter,130 it
is the reliability of these hearsay statements that undergirds the exceptions that
allow most of them into evidence.131 Since an essential component to establish
probable cause, or articulable suspicion to engage in a seizure, is the reliability of
127. See Farley & van der Hoek, supra note 126.
128. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 10, Navarette, 134 S. Ct. 1683).
129. See id. at 1686–87.
130. FED. R. EVID. 801, 802.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1142 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “reliability is the
touchstone of all the hearsay exceptions”); Richard D. Friedman, Toward A Partial Economic Game-Theoretical
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the informant or the information provided, why not just incorporate the relevant
evidence rules into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence? This is precisely what the
Court did in Navarette when it asserted that the anonymous 911 was both an
excited utterance and a present sense impression.132 While the application of
evidence law is not illogical, a closer look at the principles embodied in that law
shows that its application to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is flawed.
Before evidentiary exceptions permitting the use of certain hearsay statements
in a criminal trial are allowed to play a key role in determining whether a seizure is
justified under the Fourth Amendment, some important questions need to be asked.
First, is there something in the process of using the hearsay statement at trial that is
different than the process of using it in the Fourth Amendment context? Second, if
such a difference does exist, is that difference significant? Third, is there anything
the Court has dealt with in related areas of law to inform whether or not hearsay
statement exceptions should legitimize seizures?
A. Comparing the Processes by Which Hearsay Statements Are Used in Trials
with Their Use in Authorizing Fourth Amendment Seizures
Prior to the admission of a hearsay statement in a criminal trial, an opposing
party may object that the statement is inadmissible under the hearsay exceptions—
requiring a ruling from the judge before the statement is used in court.133 If the
objection is successful, no prejudice has accrued from the mere uttering of the
statement.134 Contrast that with a hearsay statement used to justify depriving a
person of his or her freedom, such as the one used by police to compel Navarette to
pull his car over and submit to questioning.135 No such objection is available
before the seizure has occurred, and, therefore, no judicial approval is necessary to
effect it. Of course, seizures without warrants—and therefore without prior
judicial approval—occur regularly and are often valid.136 The point here is that
what occurs when a person is seized differs from the process of merely obtaining a
statement to be used in court.
Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (“The categorical exceptions [to the hearsay rule] are
based principally on the perceived trustworthiness of the statements fitting within them.”).
132. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689–90.
133. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether . . . evidence is
admissible.”).
134. This is because the jury will not have heard the hearsay statement if the party opposing its admission
makes a timely objection that is sustained.
135. See Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1686–87.
136. See, e.g., Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches To Prevent
Destruction Of Evidence: The Need For a Rule, 17 PACE L. REV. 37, 86–87 (1997) (explaining that the Supreme
Court routinely permits warrantless vehicle searches and searches involving exigent circumstances). For example,
in 2014 over 45,000 people in New York City were stopped by the police without warrants. See Stop-and-Frisk
Data, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
While perhaps not all of those stopped would have been designated as seized, many, of course, were, including no
doubt the 8000 or so not found to be “totally innocent.” See id.
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The significance of this distinction is clear. Aside from the vital deprivation of
freedom that accompanies every seizure,137 a lawful seizure often permits the
police to engage in other Fourth Amendment-implicated law enforcement tech-
niques. If a suspect is lawfully detained, the police may seize any evidence of a
crime they see in plain view138 or, as was the case in Navarette, police may use
their sense of smell to create the additional probable cause necessary to search a
vehicle.139 An especially common policing technique used when seizing a vehicle
is to request permission to search the vehicle.140 As a suspect does not have to be
informed of the right to withhold consent,141 many suspects consent to such
searches, even knowing there is contraband present.142 Therefore, when compar-
ing the process by which hearsay statements are admitted into evidence in criminal
trials with the parallel process for their use in satisfying the Fourth Amendment,
the difference in the degree of intrusion or prejudice to the individual is significant.
B. The Relevance of the Court’s Sixth Amendment Holdings
When a court attempts to graft evidentiary principles onto constitutional
doctrine, it should consider the relevance of factors that the Supreme Court has
decided are important to protecting other constitutional rights. In Crawford v.
137. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 n.5 (1984) (describing a “seizure” of a person as
“meaningful interference, however brief, with an individual’s freedom of movement”).
138. Consider:
The plain view doctrine authorizes seizure of illegal or evidentiary items visible to a police officer
whose access to the object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification and who has probable
cause to suspect that the item is connected with criminal activity . . . The plain view doctrine is
grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item
first-hand, its owner’s privacy interest in that item is lost; the owner may retain the incidents of title
and possession but not privacy.
Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985) (finding probable cause to search a vehicle
when customs officers “detected the distinct odor of marijuana”); United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201, 203 (4th
Cir. 1982) (“Sufficient probable cause arises when the officer smells marijuana inside the vehicle.”).
140. See Consent Searches, AMS. FOR EFFECTIVE LAW ENF’T, http://www.aele.org/consent.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2015) (noting that during a traffic stop police officers will often “request a consent to search the driver’s
vehicle”).
141. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (providing that “the government need not
establish [] knowledge [of the right to refuse consent] as the sine qua non of an effective consent”).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval-Vasquez, 435 F.3d 739, 744–45 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding consent to
search was voluntary where, in addition to other circumstances, defendant helped agents locate drugs and directed
them to another location where drugs might be located); United States v. Todhunter, 297 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding consent voluntary where defendant acknowledged the presence of a loaded firearm and
contraband, and pointed to areas in the cabin where police would find them); United States v. Hernandez, 279 F.3d
302, 307–08 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding consent to search voluntary where defendant likely knew contraband would
be found but initially claimed she did not know of any in her suitcase); United States v. Hathcock, 103 F.3d 715,
720 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding consent to search duffel bag voluntary where suspect believed officers would
inevitably detect illegal substances inside); United States v. Crespo, 834 F.2d 267, 271–72 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding
consent to search apartment voluntary where suspect likely believed agents would not find drugs hidden inside).
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Washington, the Supreme Court decided that the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation may be violated even when there has been compliance with the rules
of evidence.143 Specifically, the Court in Crawford held that the fact that a hearsay
statement falls into one of the enumerated exceptions of either state evidence law
or the Federal Rules of Evidence does not immunize it from the strictures of the
Sixth Amendment.144 What makes some hearsay statements violative of the Sixth
Amendment is that they are deemed to be testimonial.145 That is, the statement is
made for the purpose of establishing or furthering a criminal prosecution, and is
usually made to a law enforcement officer or someone in a similar position.146 That
definition of testimonial would seem to apply to the anonymous 911 call in
Navarette.147
In Crawford, the Court discussed the importance of the right of confrontation
and specifically how it protected criminal defendants when the evidence at issue is
testimonial in nature.148 More generally, however, one reason why testimonial
evidence is not permitted even if it falls under an established hearsay exception is
that statements of an accusatory nature are more open to false motives.149 In other
words, they are less trustworthy than non-testimonial statements made to friends or
relatives, or during casual conversation.150
When the Supreme Court held in Davis v. Washington that a 911 call was not
testimonial, it did so because the caller was reporting “an ongoing emergency.”151
The caller was being beaten at the moment of the call and,152 therefore, was
probably calling to seek help rather than with an eye towards prosecution.153 This
made the call less likely to be fabricated.154 Conversely, any emergency in
143. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 36 (2004).
144. See id. at 61, 68–69.
145. See id. (“Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of
‘reliability.’”).
146. See id. at 51–53.
147. The 911 call in Navarette was made to a law enforcement agency, and the call was made with the purpose
of providing authorities with information to pursue a criminal investigation of the alleged offending vehicle and
its occupants. See 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2014).
148. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–63.
149. See George Fisher, The Crawford Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 17, 27 (2014) (“[W]hen
crime witnesses speak (and officers question) ‘with an eye toward trial,’ they have an incentive to lie (and elicit
lies). This explanation, rooted in testimonial hearsay’s unreliability, makes good sense.”).
150. See id. (suggesting that crime witnesses questioned in anticipation of a trial have an incentive to lie, and
their testimonial statements are therefore less trustworthy than statements made without the prospect of criminal
prosecution attached).
151. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827–28 (2006).
152. See id. at 817.
153. See id. at 817–18. In fact, when police arrived, they observed the caller’s “shaken state” with “‘fresh
injuries on her forearm and face.’” Id. at 818. This behavior is not indicative of someone strategically calling 911
with an eye toward trial. Rather, this caller apparently feared for her life at the moment of the call.
154. See id. at 817–18. In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361 (2011), the Court described the “existence of
an ongoing emergency” versus “proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution” as
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Navarette was clearly over when the 911 call was made, and, in fact, the caller had
not even seen the suspect’s car for five minutes.155
While the protections embodied in the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
have a different purpose than those contained in the Fourth Amendment’s protec-
tions from unreasonable searches and seizures, it is interesting to note that the
ongoing emergency that made the 911 call trustworthy in Davis was not present
when the caller in Navarette dialed 911. More fundamentally, whether the period
of time between the event and the statement in Davis fell within the excited
utterance and present sense impression exceptions to hearsay was a determination
separate from whether the statement was testimonial and, therefore, of constitu-
tional significance. Different principles become relevant when applying a constitu-
tional right than do when applying an evidentiary rule, even if the underlying
evidence is the same in both scenarios and the justifications appear similar. In its
attempt to apply the present sense and excited utterance exceptions to the
anonymous call in Navarette, the Court should have at least assessed the signifi-
cance of this distinction.
C. The Relationship between the Evidence and the Constitutional Protection
Even more basic in the determination of whether to admit evidence into a
criminal trial when challenged by a constitutional protection is the relationship
between the use of the evidence and the core values behind a constitutional
protection. In Crawford and the line of cases that have followed, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that the introduction of evidence deemed testimonial,
without the ability of the defendant to cross-examine the declarant, destroys the
purposes behind the Sixth Amendment guarantee of confrontation.156 Similarly,
the use of information that bears no meaningful indicia of reliability defeats the
Fourth Amendment’s requirement that probable cause or reasonable suspicion be
present before the government intrudes upon a person’s freedom.157 As indicated
previously, there are exceptions to this Fourth Amendment requirement that have
important considerations in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, which bears on whether a
statement is testimonial. “[T]he idea [is] that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the
primary purpose of resolving that emergency is presumably significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause
does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of cross-examination.” Id.
155. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
156. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.
305, 305 (2009) (finding a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when the court
admitted certificates noting the quantity of cocaine found without allowing the defendant to cross-examine the
affiants); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366, 373–76 (2008) (“The Sixth Amendment seeks fairness
indeed—but seeks it through very specific means (one of which is confrontation) that were the trial rights of
Englishmen.”).
157. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990) (noting the Court’s precedent that Fourth Amendment
requirements are satisfied when police forcibly stop a suspect based on information that provides sufficient indicia
of reliability).
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nothing to do with the reliability of anonymous informants.158 When anonymous
informants form the justification for a search or seizure, however, the Court has
consistently required some indication that the informant or the information is
reliable.159 This is hardly surprising because, as Justice Kennedy noted in J.L.,
“[i]f the telephone call is truly anonymous, the informant has not placed his
credibility at risk and can lie with impunity. The reviewing court cannot judge the
credibility of the informant and the risk of fabrication becomes unacceptable.”160
This is because an officer’s suspicion of criminal activity cannot be reasonable if
based upon informants or information not shown to be reliable.161
In J.L., the Court distinguished situations in which an informant’s lack of
reliability would not necessarily bar the use of his statement to justify a seizure.162
This distinction was critical to longstanding, core issues involving the Fourth
Amendment. In rejecting the argument that the standard of reliability to demon-
strate reasonable suspicion should be relaxed or eliminated because of the inherent
dangers of guns, the Court noted that an automatic firearm exception “would rove
too far.”163 Such a relaxation of reliability standards “would enable any person
seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive embarrassing search of the
targeted person simply by placing an anonymous call reporting the target’s
carriage of an unlawful gun.”164 That is precisely the danger risked by permitting
an anonymous call, such as the one in Navarette, to justify the deprivation of one’s
freedom. Without the presence of reliability indicia discussed in J.L. or White, or
any other real means of showing the informant was trustworthy, anonymous tips
should not form the basis of a search or seizure. However, the Court explicitly left
open the possibility that—notwithstanding the lack of such reliability—a search
and seizure might be permitted where the danger presented in the anonymous tip
was especially great, such as that a person was carrying a bomb; or that the danger
occurred in a place where the suspect has a diminished expectation of Fourth
Amendment privacy, such as at an airport or school.165 Clearly, an anonymous tip
that a driver forced the informant off the road at least ten minutes before the
158. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (searching and seizing parolees); Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (drug testing school students who participate in extracurricular activities); Mich. Dep’t
of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (seizing drivers at sobriety checkpoints); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (Border Patrol agents policing areas sufficiently close to the United
States-Mexico border); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches).
159. See, e.g., White, 496 U.S. at 330 (describing anonymous tips as requiring “more information . . . to
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable”).
160. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
161. See id. at 270 (explaining that, absent corroboration or other indicia of reliability, bare tips from purely
anonymous informants do not support reasonable suspicion).
162. Id. at 270–71.
163. Id. at 272.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 273–74.
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suspect’s car is seized166 does not equate with the danger of a bomb, especially
when the officer follows the car for five minutes and notes no danger to be present
in the driving.167
When properly applied, such an analysis conforms to longstanding exigency
exceptions to Fourth Amendment. In other words, when the danger is great and the
police need to act quickly, they may do so even where they do not possess the
normal degree of suspicion or a warrant.168 Considering both the Fourth Amend-
ment’s exigency exception and the J.L. rule would form a reasonable basis upon
which to determine when to relax the reliability standard for anonymous calls.
Such a situation was clearly not present in Navarette. To substitute hearsay
exceptions that are concerned with the rules of evidence for core Fourth Amend-
ment principles—as was done by the Court in Navarette—is a mistake and should
be abandoned.
CONCLUSION
This Article has pointed out the failings of the Supreme Court’s recent approach
to the manner by which the government must establish reliability in order to
conduct a search or seizure. The Court’s opinion in Navarette v. California is
deeply flawed, both in the means it used to show the seizure was reliable, and in its
application of those means to the facts of the case. The Navarette opinion either
misinterpreted or misapplied the two previous cases dealing with reliability for
limited seizures. The anonymous informant in Navarette was substantially less
reliable than the one in Alabama v. White, a case acknowledged by the Court to
possess the minimum degree of reliability needed to establish the reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity required for such a seizure.169
Instead, when considering the criteria for reliability that had been used by the
Court until Navarette, the Navarette informant was remarkably similar to the
informant in Florida v. J.L., whose reliability was deemed insufficient to satisfy
the Fourth Amendment.170 As in J.L., the informant in Navarette never predicted
future actions of the suspect that proved to be accurate.171 It was precisely the
accurate predictions in White that the Court found crucial in its determination that
the informant there was reliable.172 As in J.L., the Navarette informant merely
166. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (2014).
167. See id. at 1687.
168. See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1853 (2011) (describing an exigency exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement). In Bing ex rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555, 564–65 (6th Cir. 2006),
the court applied the exigency doctrine to allow a warrantless entry into Bing’s house because of the danger that
existed based on the report of shots fired and the belief that Bing was homicidal.
169. See supra notes 48–61 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
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reported observations that anyone present could have made.173 A key difference is
that in J.L. there was nothing that tended to make the informant’s claims less likely
to be accurate,174 whereas in Navarette the officer’s observations of the suspect
driving safely did just that.175
Attempts by the majority in Navarette to defend its holding by creating new
methods of establishing reliability are equally flawed. Arguing that the hearsay
exceptions of present sense impression and excited utterance would apply to the
statement of the anonymous informant is problematic on several fronts. First, it is
debatable whether the exceptions even apply in this case.176 The time interval
between the triggering event (the informant’s claim she was forced off the road)
and her statement to the police should negate the use of the present sense
impression exception.177 While that time interval by itself would likely not
invalidate the use of the excited utterance exception,178 the fact that there is no
evidence that the informant was under the stress of the triggering event when she
made her statement is significant. Other factors about the call in Navarette raise
questions about whether this hearsay statement would be admissible based on
the excited utterance exception. Specifically, the informant was not just unavail-
able but also unidentified, her claims about the suspect’s dangerous driving were
entirely uncorroborated, and her call provided specific details suggesting her
emotional state was far from excited.179
The more fundamental problem with using the hearsay exceptions as the
Navarette Court did is the undefended application of evidence law to constitutional
doctrine. In fact, the process by which the statements are used is quite different
when attempting to admit a hearsay statement at trial than when using it to
authorize a seizure. No prejudice occurs to a party objecting to the admission of a
hearsay statement at a criminal trial unless and until a judge determines that it
meets both evidentiary and Sixth Amendment requirements.180 On the other hand,
the use of a hearsay statement to justify a warrantless seizure deprives a person of
his or her freedom without any prior authorization by a court.181 This does not
mean the police must obtain judicial authorization before executing certain
seizures, but it does point to the need for using different criteria in assessing such
seizures, taking into account differences in processes and purposes.
173. See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686–87 (2014); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269–71
(2000).
174. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 100–06 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
180. See supra Section IV.A.
181. See supra notes 137–42 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Navarette Court’s argument that the use of the 911 system contrib-
utes to the reliability of the caller is flawed both in its application to the facts of the
case itself and in its general understanding of the 911 system. Emergency 911
systems only sometimes record calls, only sometimes preserve the calls they
record, and only sometimes can detect the identity or location of a caller.182 In
Navarette itself, the caller was never identified.183 Assuming, arguendo, that the
police can detect and use 911 calls as the Court maintains, the use of those calls to
establish reliability rests upon an assumption that, again, is generally unsound and
specifically inapplicable to the facts of Navarette. Neither research studies nor
logic suggests that 911 callers are aware that their identity can be discovered.184
Why would some insist on anonymity, as the caller in Navarette did, if they
believed the police could discover their identity from the call itself? The caller in
Navarette took no action before, during, or after the call to suggest she either
wished to be identified or thought she could be.185
In order to protect fundamental principles embodied in the probable cause and
reasonable suspicion requirements of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court
must establish clear and logical guidelines to determine the reliability of infor-
mants. Such guidelines should proceed from certain basic tenets. As the Court has
repeatedly held, anonymous informants provide the least reliable means of
obtaining information. Such informants put nothing at risk when they withhold
their identity, and there are no facts to assess whether they are the sort of people
who ought to be believed. To accept such informants as being reliable, there must
be significant additions to their reliability. One such addition occurs when an
informant accurately predicts a suspect’s future actions.186 Another addition
occurs when an informant possesses information about the suspect that is both
correct and unknown to the general public.187 Other means of adding to an
anonymous informant’s reliability, such as advances in technology—which could
include accurate methods of tracking a suspect’s location or identity—should be
available to the police, but only if those means are realistic in achieving greater
informant reliability and do not threaten the values embodied in the Fourth
Amendment.
182. See supra notes 125–28 and accompanying text.
183. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1688 (2014) (treating the tip as anonymous, thus implying that
the caller was never identified).
184. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990).
187. See id.
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